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 What are the characteristics of female terrorists and extremists? What are the 
factors and drivers that lend to their decisions to join or attempt to join a terrorist 
organization or carry out a terrorist attack? While modern studies in terrorism have begun 
looking at females, the literature is still often limited. Studies are rarely comparative or 
cross-regional and tend to focus on specific roles. Much of the literature is also allocated 
towards understanding the media’s perception of female terrorists as well as the 
phenomenon of suicide bombers. Case studies of 41 females from the Counter Extremism 
Project, Terrorist and Extremism Database (TED) were analyzed using descriptive 
statistics and content analysis to explore the characteristics of female terrorists and 
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Sun Tzu has famously said, “know your enemy and know yourself; in a hundred 
battles you will never be in peril.” It is therefore crucial to understand the mind of a 
terrorist to effectively counter them. The research question for this study is:  What 
characteristics do female terrorists and extremists between 2000 and 2020 have?  
In the broader literature on terrorism, group dynamics, group leaders, group 
strategies and tactics, are crucial factors in understanding terrorist and extremist groups. 
These factors, however, can be understood by looking at the individuals inside the 
groups. Understanding the characteristics of the individuals may be at the heart of 
understanding terrorism.  
Until the twentieth century, the literature on terrorism was predominantly male-
focused. 20th-century scholarship had to play catch-up by adding gender studies to 
terrorism studies, and there are still many gaps that can be filled. In the following section, 
an overview of the existing literature will focus on the broader understanding of terrorism 
and radicalization, and the specific literature on women in terrorism. The literature 
review will highlight the existing gaps.  
This study is important because while female terrorists are now less of an 
anomaly, the current scholarship is still often limited to specific regions, group affiliation, 
roles, or types of violence. Case studies of 41 female terrorists and extremists will be 
analyzed to fill in those gaps. This dataset is cross-regional, does not focus on one 
terrorist or extremist group, and includes various roles and characteristics. Because of the 
robustness of the dataset, this study adds to the field of female terrorists and extremists 




 The following overview of the existing literature will begin by defining terrorism, 
followed by an examination of the broader literature of terrorism without particular focus 
on gender. Then, a closer look at the literature focusing on female terrorism will be 
analyzed. This section will also focus on media portrayal, discussion of female suicide 
bombers, other roles, and lastly, the gaps in the existing studies. 
Definition  
To understand female terrorists and extremists, definitions need to be established. 
However, there is no one working definition of terrorism which makes it difficult to 
classify terrorism across the board. Vergani explains that the “ambiguity of key terms 
such as radicalization and extremism, which by their very nature identify a relative 
position on a continuum of opinions and behaviors.”1 For the purpose of this study, 
Galvan’s definition of terrorism will be adopted: “acts and events systematically 
propagandized for the purpose of instilling massive fear in individuals and/or the public 
at large, and which are deliberately used for coercive purposes. Terrorists are those who 
engage in those activities, whatever form they take.”2 For extremism, the FBI definition 
will be utilized: “encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a 
violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals.”3 These 
definitions were chosen to encompass terrorist and extremism broadly in terms of region, 
roles, or motivations.  
 
 
1 Vergani, et al., 2018 
2 Galvin, 1983 
3 FBI, ‘What is Violent Extremism’ 
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Broader Scholarship on Terrorism (Gender Not Accounted For) 
The understanding of the psychology of terrorists has shifted over the years. John 
Horgan gives an extensive overview of the ‘individual approaches’ in his book The 
Psychology of Terrorism. Chapter three explores the psyche of those who are 
radicalized.4 In the 1970s, terrorists were characterized as having psychopathic 
tendencies. This belief stemmed from the idea that “psychopaths lack remorse or guilt for 
his/her activities and a selfish, egotistical world view that precludes any genuine welfare 
for others.”5 Corrado, a leading scholar on the mental state of terrorists, argues that “the 
true terrorist must steel himself against tenderheartedness through a fierce faith in his 
credo or by a blessed retreat into a comforting, individual madness.”6 However, some 
basic characteristics of terrorists, contradict the traits of psychopaths. The main 
difference, that psychopaths usually do not accept social construction, while terrorists do. 
Horgan highlights that a “terrorist motivation is overwhelmingly and inseparably linked 
to a need to ‘belong’ to the group (any group will do it seems, and if the opportunity 
arises, the terrorist group will do) and ‘hence’ the group becomes central to identity 
formation in the terrorist.”7   
In the 1980s and 90s, personality traits of terrorists were attributed to narcissism 
and paranoia. However, scholars such as Corrado found no evidence of psychological 
abnormalities, and many other studies such as Lyons and Harbinson, supported this.8 
Another popular theory was the frustration-aggression hypothesis (FAH); terrorism as a 
 
4 Horgan, 2005, Chapter 3 
5 Horgan 2005, 49 
6 Corrado,1981, 293— 309 
7 Horgan 2005, 61 
8 Corrado,1981; Lyons and Harbinson, 1986  
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response to frustration, or blockage of attainment of one’s personal or environmental 
goals.9 This theory was often criticized for its transfer from terrorism in the individual 
context to the collective group, and as Horgan echoes, is limited as a theory to explain 
terrorism.10 
Scholars such as Ferracuti argue that terrorists are ‘not normal’ and are 
“characterized by a specific, finite set of trait behaviors.”11 However, most of the modern 
literature suggests that terrorists, especially politically motivated, tend to be normal 
individuals. The reason they do not feel remorse, argue scholars such as Horgan, is 
because they rationalize their actions and believe they are fighting for a righteous cause.12 
This may explain why terrorists were initially characterized as psychopaths lacking 
remorse because they deemed their violence as necessary and justifiable. 
The differing theories are broken down into two theoretical frameworks. 
According to Horgan, the theories that look at the psychological differences in terrorists, 
falls under the positivist school of thought which looks at “influences outside the realm of 
free will [which] offer a more sensible approach to viewing the criminal. These 
influences were to be found, positivists argued, by looking at biological, sociological and 
psychological factors (e.g. genetics, environment and personality, respectively) or any 
combination of two or more of these.”13 Positivism aims to counter another theoretical 
framework, ‘rational theory’ which suggests engagement in terrorism is done through a 
 
9 Berkowitz, 1965 (as cited in Horgan 2005) 
10 Merari and Friedland (as cited in Horgan 2005) 
11 Ferracuti, 1982 (As cited in Horgan, 2005, p 65) 
12 Horgan, 2005; Silke, 1998 
13 Ibid.  
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rational process “of judging whether the expected results of engagement in crime 
outweigh the consequences of the punishment that would follow if apprehended.”14  
Randy Borum highlights four observable stages of radicalization in 
‘Understanding the Terrorist Mind-Set.’  First, he explains, the individual identifies an 
undesirable event or condition whether it be economical, social, etc. The individual then 
frames this as “injustice”, and then proceeds to identify a potential target that can be 
blamed for the injustice. Finally, this individual or entity responsible for the injustice is 
deemed as evil, justifying any violence towards the target.15 
Vergani et al., in a more recent study, identify three Ps of radicalization: push, 
pull, and personal factors. Push factors include structural root causes such as state 
repression, deprivation, and poverty. Pull factors are factors that would explain why 
extremism and terrorism are appealing to the individual. This includes ideology, group 
belonging, group mechanics, and incentives. Lastly, personal factors are what makes the 
individual more vulnerable to radicalization than their peers: trauma, psychological 
disorders, and personality traits.18  
The literature on female terrorism 
The studies and frameworks discussed above do not take gender into account. The 
literature on female terrorism starts to narrow down.  
Matusitz and Berisha provide four common theories of female terrorists: Albert 
Bandura’s Social Learning Theory, Edwin Sutherland’s Differential association theory 
(DAT), Robert Agnew’s General Strain Theory (GST), and Rational Choice Theory 
 
14 Ibid. 
15 Borum, 2003 
18 Vergani et al., 2018 
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(RCT). 19 They apply Social Learning Theory to explain why females might be more 
susceptible to radicalization. Using ISIS as a case study, they argue that “the ISIS 
community plays a crucial role in fostering a learning environment, whether physical or 
online, leading to this process.”20 This is consistent with many other studies about the 
Islamic State.21 The Social learning theory also mirrors the broader literature on terrorism 
by explaining how through societal rules, or laws, women may be taught to rationalize 
the dehumanization of ‘infidels’ or ‘apostates’, thus rationalizing acts of terrorism.  
Differential association theory (DAT) which presumes that individuals learn 
criminal behavior through social interactions. This theory also explains how an individual 
may rationalize terrorism.  Robert Agnew’s General Strain Theory (GST) theorizes that 
criminal behavior is more likely when there are certain stressors. This coincides with 
much of the literature on push, pull and personal factors of radicalization.22 Lastly, 
Rational Choice Theory (RCT),  which has been discussed extensively in the previous 
section, explains that collective social behavior is produced via the behavior of individual 
actors, and those actors are rational beings, aware of their choices and actions. 
Media Portrayal of Female Terrorists 
 The media portrayal of females who join terrorist or extremist groups are often 
skewed, misrepresented, and lends to difficulty in truly understanding them. This is 
important to recognize as it often frames them incorrectly which gets translated into the 
literature, scholarship, and ultimately, policies.  
 
19 Matusitz et al., Chapter 3 
20 Ibid., p 38 
21  Horgan, 2005; Silk, 1998; Borum, 2003 
22 Vergani et al., 2018 
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While women are active members of terrorist groups, with estimates ranging from 
20- 30 percent membership, they are still portrayed as anomalies. Nacos explains that this 
occurs because “whenever women commit acts of terror, most people react with an extra 
level of shock and horror.”23 The way the media drives female involvement in terrorism 
is two- fold: first, it is inaccurate and casts female terrorists as less dangerous; hence, it 
creates a strategic advantage for groups to recruit females. The disconnect between the 
reality and the agenda that the media sets forth makes it difficult to accurately detect and 
counter female radicalization. Second, because utilizing females garners more attention, 
terrorist groups recognize their “propaganda value.”24 Sjoberg and Gentry have found 
that when women commit acts of terror, their sex is much more of a discussion than when 
men do and that “in stories of women terrorists, the perpetrators are often described as 
women first and as terrorists second.”25 
To take it even further, Nacos suggests that the media coins names such as “black 
widows'', to frame the female Chechen terrorists as a “vengeance-seeking widow who 
becomes a terrorist because her husband was killed by Russian troops—a woman with a 
strong personal rather than political motive,” which further skews the reality of female 
terrorist motivations.27 This creates a gender skewed perception that even when females 
are involved in the politics of the groups, their true motivations lie with personal 
motivations such as family ties and revenge. Similarly, referring to female ISSI members 
as “jihadi bride” creates the romantic notion of women joining the Islamic States for the 
prospect of finding a husband. While case studies of females being recruited by romantic 
 
23 Nacos, 2005, 435-51. 
24 Bloom, 2011, 7. 
25 Sjoberg and Gentry, 2016 
27 Nacos 2005, 440 
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lovers or marrying IS members are not uncommon, naming them Jihadi Brides frames the 
motive in a narrowed, gendered lens.  
Female Suicide Bombers 
The literature on female terrorism may be limited as it often focuses solely on 
suicide bombing.29 While literature on suicide bombing is vast, for the sake of this paper, 
it will not be reviewed as it is too lengthy and not what this study aims to focus on. 
Between 1985 and 2006, there have been more than 220 female suicide bombers and the 
numbers have only increased with time.30 In fact, “from April 11, 2011, to June 30, 2017, 
Boko Haram deployed 434 bombers to 247 different targets during 238 suicide-bombing 
attacks. At least 56% of these bombers were women and at least 81 bombers were 
specifically identified as children or teenagers.”31 Whether this says more about Boko 
Haram’s tactic of using females as suicide bombers, or about the female suicide bombers 
themselves, is unclear. The number, however, is noteworthy because between 2014 and 
2019, majority of the suicide bombings are accredited to Boko Haram.32 
         One common explanation for a terrorist group’s utilization of female suicide 
bombers is the powerful propaganda value as it garners more attention. In this case, the 
media is not conducting the framing, but the group is controlling the media; a strategic 
tactic that is often successful.33 Sawicki argues that “suicide bombing used to be a 
disturbing phenomenon. It has become so common that now it is the phenomenon of 
 
29 Speckhard 2008; Patel 2017; Warner and Maffess, 2017; Brunner, 2005; Alacok 2020; Jacques & 
Taylor, 2008; Schweitzer, 2006; Turner, 2016; Alexander 2017 
30  Speckhard 2008, 1025 
31 Warner & Maffess 2017, IV 
32 Global Terrorism Index 2019, 5 
33 Turner, (2016), 15-19 
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women and children as the human bombs that causes remarks.”34 Women offer a tactical 
advantage as suicide bombers as they are less suspicious and can reach a target with less 
suspicion.35 
Speckhard argues that what motivates females to join terrorist groups as suicide 
bombers is not significantly different from what motivates their male counterparts, and 
while trauma is a major personal motivation, it does not make them psychologically 
abnormal..36 Other motivations include revenge on behalf of their husbands, as well as a 
sense of empowerment, a seemingly gendered explanation to the motivations of female 
suicide bombers. Patel links martyrdom with postpartum depression and psychosis, 
corresponding to the literature on psychodynamics of terrorists, but that a lack of societal 
support, as well as gender suppression, may explain this link further.37 Patel also explores 
how women are 3rd class citizens in Islamic communities, and therefore, there tends to be 
more community support for female martyrs.38 However, this explanation is limited to 
explaining Islamic female martyrs specifically. On the other hand, scholars such as 
Peresin and Cervone argue that “women have no fewer motives than men for engaging in 
jihad. They share the same political motives and may have additional personal reasons to 
seek revenge, as the loss of their male relatives or the violation of their honor.”39 The 
narratives often contradict each other and tend to focus on limiting factors.  
 
 
34 Sawicki, 2016 
35 Turner, 2016, 16; Spechkard, 2008, 1027; Alexander, 2017, 195; Peresin & Cervone, 2015; Kleinsmith, 
2015 
36 Speckhard, 2008, 1023 
37  Patel, 2017, 85. 
38  Ibid., 89 
39  Peresin and Cervone, 2015, 497 
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Other Roles for Females  
         While a lot of attention is allocated to female suicide bombers, females have 
many other roles in terrorist groups. The assumption that female terrorists are limited in 
their roles stems from gender stereotypes.40 Alexander, while focusing only on female 
jihadists particularly in America, identifies their contributions as: plotters, those who 
have an active role in designing, attempting or carrying out terrorist attacks; supporters, 
those who collect support, and propagate information; and travelers, those who migrate 
outside of the US to participate.41 Women have many roles ranging from auxiliary and 
non-combative, to foreign fighters. The difficulty in forming a typology is that roles of 
female terrorists often fluctuate and differ between regions and groups. In fact, women 
tend to have active roles in combat or leadership, in all rebel groups.42 Cunningham has 
found in her cross regional study on female terrorists that women tend to be more 
politically active in leftist organizations and Kleinsmith suggests that women tend to take 
on more leadership roles in leftist groups too.43 Women are particularly successful as 
recruiters and propagandists, with ISIS especially, networking and recruiting online on 
higher levels than males.44 
While many themes and factors arise when looking at the literature of female 
terrorists, the challenge is that they vary between regions, roles, and types of group (i.e. 
political/ideological). Peresin and Cervone find that the most prominent motivation is 
ideological.45 However, that is focused predominantly on Western foreign fighters. A 
 
40 Alexander 2016; Bloom 2011 
41 Alexander, 2016 
42 Henshaw 2016; Cunningham 2013 
43 Cunningham, 2013; Kleinsmith, 2015 
44 Manrique et al., 2016 
45 Peresin and Cervone, 2015, 500 
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common motivations for male Western foreign fighters include financial incentives, but 
is not prominent amongst ISIS women according to their study.46 Perhaps this is because 
a lot of the women who join groups such as ISIS do come from well-off families, hence, 
the financial aspect may not tempt that as much as their male counterparts. On the other 
hand, while female Boko Haram members primarily also join for ideological reasons, 
freedom, and resources such as Koranic education, in Nigeria, 4 percent of girls are 
unable to finish secondary school, creating a push factor that may not exist for Western 
women.47 For women in the Western Balkans who join the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, 
motivations vary from socio-economic conditions, ideological views, family relations, 
identity crises, and trauma.48 In an examination of cross- regional female terrorists, 
Cunningham found that Algerian women join for the same political objectives as men, 
however, for women, it is coupled with other pull factors such as poverty.49 
Furthermore, in a patriarchal society such as in the Western Balkans, women may 
join groups such as ISIS because they are following their husbands’ orders.50 This 
heightens the gendered lens on why women would join terrorist groups and makes away 
with their own personal motivations by solely victimizing them and making away with 
political motivations. Furthermore, not all female terrorists join voluntarily. Boko Haram, 
for instance, is notorious for their kidnappings, forcing young women to join, marry, or 
martyr themselves for the group. Because of their young ages, many are not aware of 
what they are in fact doing.51 However, it is crucial not to make away with the true 
 
46 Ibid., 500 
47  Bigio & Vogelstein 2019, 4 
48 Kelmendi, 2019, 23 
49 Cunningham 2003, 175 
50 Kelmendi, 2019, 22 
51 Warner & Maffess 2017, IV 
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motivations of those who voluntarily join terrorist groups, or the literature will continue 
to reflect gender stereotypes and counterterrorism measures will reflect those gaps.  
Limitations 
As an overview of the literature focusing on female terrorism has highlighted, 
much of the studies focus on limited factors. Some focus particularly on Jihadist groups 
and some focus only on Western female foreign fighters. A lot of the scholarship is also 
very regionally focused. Even those that are cross regional such as Cunningham’s study, 
focus mostly on political violence. It is difficult to derive a comprehensive understanding 
of female terrorists when the datasets are limited in factors such as regions and groups. 
Even the three studies that were found to be comprehensive and comparative, have its 
limitations. Yon & Milton examined the differences between male and female terrorists 
across different ideological groups. However, their database was limited to Western 
women. Jacques, K., & Taylor’s study, while a strong comparative analysis utilizing 
biographical accounts of 30 females and 30 males, is limited to suicide bombing. Jacques, 
K., & Taylor look at a larger dataset of 222 female perpetrators and 269 males and it 
looks at the broader trends in terrorism. As the authors note, however, it is limited in the 
sense that the male sample was not exactly a match to the female sample.  
METHODS AND DATA 
 As this is an exploratory research study, no hypothesis was necessary. The aim of 
this study was to create a preliminary and inductive understanding of the characteristics 
of female terrorists and extremists and see what missing gaps in the existing scholarship 
can be filled in. To guard against bias, the research question is very open-ended. To fill in 
some of the missing gaps highlighted in the literature review, this study aimed to be 
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exploratory. It does not seek to prove or disprove any existing theory or assumptions of 
female terrorist and extremists, but rather to explore the characteristics that are found 
amongst this sample.  
 This study used secondary research methods by taking a case study approach. 
Because of the sensitive nature of terrorism and extremism, this is a hard to reach and a 
‘hidden population’, making interviews a non-viable option. As a basis, the Counter 
Extremism Project (CEP) Terrorist and Extremism Database (TED) “of extremist and 
terrorist leaders and operatives around the globe,” was used for the case studies.52 The 
database has hundreds of profiles, but for this study, only the 41 female terrorists and 
extremists in the database have been analyzed.53  
While eight of the case studies have very limited information as they are social 
media profiles such as Twitter users with unknown identities, they were included in this 
study to saturate the findings. Social media profiles in the database that were not 100% 
identifiable as females were not included.  
While the 41 case studies are not a purposive sample, it has limitations since it is 
derived from the TED database. For instance, while the sample is not limited to one 
specific terrorist or extremist group, majority of the case studies align with Jihadist 
groups, with only one aligned with far-right extremism. However, as a preliminary and 
exploratory study, 41 case studies are considered non-trivial as it represents a wide range 
of factors with limited constraints. Furthermore, the risks are minimized as all the 
information used in this study are non- classified and publicly accessible. 
 
52 TED, Counter Extremism Project, Nov. 10  
53 The names and photos of the case studies can be found in Appendix A 
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The first part of the analysis consists of descriptive statistics. Common 
characteristics and factors discussed in the existing literature were apparent in the 
profiles. Infogram, a data visualization platform, was utilized to quantify the 
characteristics, features, and general trends of the dataset. The factors that were 
quantified and used as ‘codes’ include: origin, group affiliation, roles and the three P’s. 
These factors were not predetermined. Rather, they were patterns found across the sample 
and used to analyze characteristics and features of female terrorists. Content analysis was 
implemented by utilizing at interviews, news articles, and social media intelligence 
(SOCINT) for further saturation. The analysis and findings will be discussed in the 
following sections.  
CODE DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 
One of the limitations in previous studies was the focus on specific groups. The 
strength of this sample is that it is cross regional and non-group specific, and it was 
therefore important to code for origin and group affiliation. As many of the subjects 
either raveled to Syria, escaped, are in hiding, or are deceased, their current residence was 
not coded for. The origin factor codes for the places that these individuals have become 
radicalized and does not include their immigration status as that is coded separately under 
push factors. Group affiliation accounts for which terrorist or extremist group the 
individuals joined or attempted to join. Much of the existing scholarship discusses the 
roles of female terrorists and whether they are only given traditional supporting roles, or 
if the landscape is changing. For this study, combative roles encompass direct roles such 
as the class foreign fighter, leadership, trainers, Hisba/enforcers, or other active military 
roles. Non- combative roles coded for propagandists, financers/fundraisers, strictly 
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supportive roles such as Jihadi bride, and couriers.  Rather than having an overlapping 
code for motivation, the three Ps: push, pull, and personal factors, were coded separately. 
Push factors include characteristics such as state repression, poverty, lack of education, 
and immigration; factors that encompass structural root causes to radicalization. Pull 
factors focus on why terrorism or extremism may be attractive to the individual and 
includes ideology, Identity/spiritual longing/belonging/purpose, incentives (marriage and 
love), activism, and feminism.  Personal factors coded for subject vulnerabilities such as 
a history of drugs and alcohol, loss, mental/psychological instability, abuse/rape, and 
rejection.  
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
This section will analyze the codes that were found amongst the sample and 
implemented graphs will explore them visually. It is important to highlight that due to the 
nature of this sample, much of the information is unknown. The ‘unknowns’ were not 
accounted for in the finding, hence, the findings are not always proportionate to the 
sample size. 
Origin  
 As portrayed in the graph, the women in the 
sample come from various locations. For this sample, 
the UK included Scotland, Northern Ireland, and 
England. While the UK and the US account for the 
largest locations of radicalization, a conclusive 
statement about recruitment hotspots is not possible 
since this is a small and non- representative sample. 
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The strength of these findings, however, is that it is cross regional and non- purposeful; it 
does not focus on case studies from a specific region. The implications of western women 
being so prominent for female radicalization may be reflective of this sample only and 
needs further analysis.  
Group Affiliation  
While the strength of this sample is 
that it is not purposive, the results show 
that majority were associated with ISIS. 
The studies discussed in the literature 
review, while often much larger, purposely 
limited their samples to specific terrorists 
and extremist groups. When samples are 
group specific, the findings may be limited 
because motivations are similar between members of the same groups and in this sample, 
majority are affiliated with jihadist groups, with only one tied to Jobbik, a far-right 
extremist group. The TED database is not limited to jihadists and accounts for 54 
different groups ranging from jihadist groups, to the KKK, to the Russian Imperial 
Movement.54 It is unclear why majority of the females in this database are jihadist and 
whether this is a significant pattern.  
 
54 TED, Counter Extremism Project 
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However, this sample does look at various groups rather than focusing 
specifically on one, including: ISIS, Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Jobbik. The two 
affiliated with the Nusra Front were grouped together with Al Qaeda. One was associated 
with both ISIS and the Nusra Front. 
 Descriptive statistics highlights that the US 
and the UK case studies are predominantly associated 
with ISIS in this sample. This does not conclusively 
suggest that most female terrorists in the UK and the 
US are affiliated with ISIS. It can simply be reflective 
of this sample and may, in fact, limit the findings.  
Roles 
According to the existing literature, traditionally, female terrorists were given 
supporting roles in their respective groups (especially in ideological groups). More recent 
studies, however, have suggested that women are given operational and active role. A 
large portion of the scholarship focus on female suicide bombers. 
The role of suicide bombers was not found amongst this sample. However, 
through content analysis, the rhetoric from some of the females suggest that they would 
martyr themselves if given the opportunity. For instance, Heather Elizabeth Coffman, 
explained in an online conversation that suicide bombings are the “highest and best type 
of martyrdom,” and did believe it was her destiny to be a suicide bomber.55 She further 
shared that “I wouldn’t go blow myself up here in the US because the battle isn’t here . . 
but if I’m there the US army is there then Yes.”56 While Coffman’s official role was a 
 
55 “United States of America v Heather Elizabeth Coffman 
56 Ibid.  
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propogandist and facilitator of ISIS, her rhetoric suggests that suicide bombing was an 
option. Similar characteristics were found for Safaa Boular. The MI5 bugged her family 
home and heard Safaa talking to her mother, wondering what it would be like to die as a 
martyr. She had downloaded pictures of suicide belts on her computer and even told the 
police that martyrdom appealed to her.57 In fact, Safaa was planning a suicide bomb and 
gun attack on the British Museum after she failed to travel to Syria.58 Because none of the 
women in this sample were characterized as suicide bombing, it is difficult to make a 
conclusive statement. 
Combative Roles: 
Traditionally, as discussed in the 
literature review, women’s roles in 
rightist terrorist groups are limited. 
However, findings did highlight 
characteristics of combative roles 
amongst the sample ranging from foreign 
fighters, military wing members, trainers, 
leaders and domestic terrorists. 
 Ahlam Ahmad al-Tamimi, for instance, reached out to the Hamas Izz ad-Din al-
Qassam Brigades (the military wing), and became the first female member of Hamas’s 
armed wing. She coordinated & aided the suicide bombing of the Sbarro pizzeria in 
Jerusalem. Before that, she placed an explosive device hidden in a beer can in a 
Jerusalem supermarket.  
 




While much of the literature argues that women are given leadership roles in 
leftist groups, Samantha Lewthwaite is believed to have had a leadership role in Al 
Shabab. While “she does not carry out attacks herself as she is too important but is 
responsible for many, many deaths-hundreds,” as one security chief claimed, “this lady 
sits at the right hand of the leader directing attacks.”59 
Krisztina Morvai is characterized in a leadership role 
as she was a Member of the European Parliament (MEP). 
Sally Jones, too, became a leader, specifically for the 
“Anwar al-Awlaki” female battalion, an all (reportedly 
widowed) female ISIS cell (as portrayed in the photo to the 
right).60 She also had a  role  in training female ISIS recruits 
from Europe on weapons and tactics for combat and suicide 
bombing.  
 The al-Khansaa Brigade, an all-female morality police brigade (Hisba) in Raqqa, 
is another way that females are active in groups such as ISIS. In this sample, Rawdah 
Abdisalaam is believed to have helped form the unit. 61 Aqsa Mahmood had a senior role 
in the al-Khansaa Brigade, enforcing Sharia law. Shamima Begum was also believed to 
be a member of the IS Hisba. Reports claim they have seen Begum holding automatic 
weapons and enforcing laws, and allegations have been made that she stitched suicide 
vests onto suicide bombers as they would have no choice but to detonate. However, in an 
interview she claimed, “they don’t have any evidence against me doing anything 
 
59 Warnok, “Samantha Lewthwaite Today” 
60 Locket, “Jihadi Bride Sally Jones”  
61 Counter Extremism Project, "Rawdah Abdisalaam." 
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dangerous. When I went to Syria I was just a housewife, the entire four years I stayed at 
home, took care of my husband, took care of my kids.”62 Begum could very well have 
said this knowing that the assumption of female terrorists is their non- violent nature, and 
made a conscious decision to utilize traditional gender assumptions to portray herself as 
less of a threat. Nevertheless, because of the nature of terrorism and the secrecy 
surrounding it, confirmation of the true nature of her role is difficult to obtain.  
 It is also difficult to categorize what constitutes as a combative role. The classic 
typical assumption of combative roles are front line foreign fighters. However, just from 
this sample alone, other active roles such as Hisba, enforcers, and roles in other military 
wings are visible. The literature cannot assume females are only in non- combative and 
supporting roles because they are failing to see other combative roles rather than the 
traditional foreign fighter.  
As this is a non- representative sample, valid statistics regarding combative roles 
cannot be determined. However, this sample does highlight characteristics of various 
active roles of female terrorists and extremists that can be further explored for more 
concrete findings. 
Non- Combative Roles 
  Non- combative roles such as propagandists, couriers, financiers/fundraisers, 
recruiters, and the traditional supporting roles of being wives, often referred to as ‘Jihadi 
brides’, were found in this sample.  
 
62 Sky News, “IS Bride Shamima Begum Full Transcript” 
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This sample showed propagandists as a 
prominent supporting role. As discussed in the 
literature review, the media and internet are key 
tools for female propagandists. Some examples 
highlight such characteristics. 
Aqsa Mahmood created a Tumblr blog where 
she shared advice and details on how female recruits 
can make hijrah (migration) to Syria. Ariel Bradley 
utilized twitter to propagandize her support of ISIS. In one post, she praised the attack on 
the two military bases in Chattanooga. The attack resulted in the death of four US 
Marines. Bradley tweeted: “Gifted this morning not only with Eid but w/ the news of a 
brother puttin fear n the heart of kufar [non-believers] n the city of my birth. 
Alhamdullilah [thanks be to God].”63 Hayat Boudemine, in an interview, called for 
women to support ISIS: “My sisters, be bases of support and safety for your husbands, 
brothers, fathers, and sons. Be advisors to 
them. They should find comfort and peace 
with you. Do not make things difficult for 
them. Facilitate all matters for them.”64 
Sally Jones propagated immensely via twitter. In one, she even threatens ed US military 
servicemen (see right).65  
 
63 Hall, "How One Young Woman Went From Fundamentalist Christian To ISIS Bride." 
64 Zelin, "Al-Hayat Media Center Presents” (as cited in TED) 
65 Counter Extremism Project, "Sally Jones." 
22 
 
GreenBirdofDabiq’s identity, while unknown, 
does exist as a propagating figure, mainly using 
Twitter to disseminate Anti-West, gay, and pro-ISIS 
rhetoric. Similarly, Hallie Sheikh, a Twitter persona, 
propagates messages such as “#BaltimoreRiots is a 
sign that the prime of the US is going down the hill! 
You can't sustain people with manmade laws! 
#Time4Shariah,” and “Pt democracy will never bring 
world order which is why shariah must be implemented to bring order #BaltimoreRiots” 
which she tweeted in 2015, exploiting the racial tensions in Baltimore.66  
Amal aka @BintRose52 turns to Twitter to propagate ISIS and denouncing 
Kuffar’s (non-believers). She also exploits 
her ability to create new accounts when 
Twitter suspends her old ones. With each new 
profile she creates, she posts screenshots of 
her previous suspended domains. Under one 
of her Twitter admins, ‘BintRose33_’ she 
tweeted: “Dear Admins, when do you finally 
get that we always come back, no matter how often you suspend our acc?!”67 
 
66 Counter Extremism Project, "Hallie Sheikh” 
67 Counter Extremism Project, "Amal aka @BintRose52” 
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 Some of the females in this sample took on more than one role, oftentimes, 
propagandists doubling as recruiters. Aqsa Mahmood, for 
instance, is classified as a foreign fighter, propagandist, 
and recruiter. The image on the right portrays one of her 
Tumblr posts.68 In addition to active social media 
platforms, Mahmood used her platforms to radicalize other 
individuals to join ISIS.  It is believed that amongst those 
Mahmood radicalized and recruited was Shamima Begum, 
also a case study in this sample. Mahmood herself was a ‘bedroom radical’; influenced 
online. On one of her (now removed) Tumblr posts she wrote: “I urge all my sisters to 
come and gain true honour by living under the law of Shariah, by marrying a brother who 
puts Allah before his desires and by being in the forefront of this Islamic revival. Wallahi 
there is nothing more sad than sitting in the sidelines.”69  
The propaganda disseminated by these women varies by each user. For instance, 
Bint Crackers, or @Umlittlecracker, does not Tweet propaganda that calls for violent 
acts, but rather, focuses on raising awareness to other radical accounts and promotes 
radical Islam and radical Islamic users on social media. As an example, in 2015 she 
Tweeted: “If you’re following me plz follow this sister @Bint_Turki_Z She makes the 
kuffar so angry that they could just go die in their rage.”70 
Interestingly 100% of those who had a role as a propogandist were affiliated with 
ISIS. This may suggest that females tend to join ISIS because it offers them non- 
 
68 National Post, “Inside the life of a 20-year-old Scottish woman.”  
69 Counter Extremism Project, "Aqsa Mahmood." 




combative options, or it can simply mean that in this sample, majority of the females are 
affiliated with ISIS so the role of propogandists is proportionate to that. While these 
findings are not confirmatory, more research should be done to understand if the role of 
propagandist acts hand in hand with the role of recruiters. More in depth research with a 
larger sample should be conducted to understand these trends. 
Motivation 
 For this study, the motivations of the female terrorists were measured by 
analyzing the three P’s: push, pull, and personal factors, as highlighted in the literature 
review section. This was chosen as the approach to allow for more characteristics to be 
accounted for, for strong analysis and understandings of female terrorists. For some of 
the profiles, any motivation is unknown and unaccounted for. The findings below may 
not be proportionate to the sample size. 
 Push Factors focus on structural root 
causes such as political grievances, lack of 
education, and immigration.  
For political grievances, patterns of 
blaming countries such as the US for the 
mistreatment of others, were apparent. For 
instance, Aafia Saddiqui blamed the US for the 
suffering of all Muslims. Her studies at University also coincided with the Bosnian War 
which added fuel to that train of thought. She blamed the US for the suffering that 
occurred in the Bosnian war and inspired others to take up arms and support Bosnian 
Muslims. Saddiqui placed this anger and blame by turning to “jihad against America.” 
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Sadiqqui once explained in University that,  “I’d be proud to be on the Most Wanted list 
because it would mean I’m doing something to help our Muslim brothers and sisters.”71 
This was a clear push factor in her radicalization process. 
Mediha Salkicevic, was one of a group of six Bosnian 
immigrants who financed ISIS fighters, and had Bosnian war 
grievances. During the war she got separated from her brother 
and mother. She outlined the pain she endured during the 
Bosnian war, in a letter to the U.S. District Judge Catherine 
Perry (see right), asking her to take those circumstances into 
consideration.72  
Ahlam Ahmad al-Tamimi is another example. She 
was living in Nabi Salah, north of Ramallah, in the West Bank during the Second 
Intifada. She initiated contact with the Qassam Brigades to join the resistance movement. 
Her push factor was the liberation of Palestine and refusal to recognize Israel's existence. 
Being motivated by such factors makes it difficult to measure remorse because the 
individual deems the target as evil and hence, their terrorist actions are justifiable to 
them. This coincides with Horgan’s explanation (discussed in the literature review) of 
why terrorists are sometimes assumed to be psychopaths. For instance, in an interview 
with Hamas Al-Aqsa TV, Ahlam talked about the attack she perpetrated, “While I was on 
the bus and everybody was congratulating one another, they said on the radio that there 
had been a martyrdom attack at the Sbarro restaurant, and that three people were killed. I 
 
71 Jacobs, "The Woman ISIS Wanted Back." 
72 Letter to U.S. District Judge Catherine Perry, "Wls Terror Mom Letter." 
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admit that I was a bit disappointed because I 
had hoped for a larger toll. Yet when they 
said, ‘three dead,’ I said: ‘Allah be praised’... 
Two minutes later, they said on the radio that 
the number had increased to five. I wanted to 
hide my smile, but I just couldn’t. ”73 Ahlam 
Ahmad al-Tamimi was politically motivated to liberate Palestine and felt that her acts of 
terror were justified.  
Aqsa Mahmood, a notorious propagandist, and recruiter who was radicalized 
during the Syrian civil war and was very concerned about the violence, is another 
example. Jaelyn Young also complained about the treatment of Muslims in the United 
States and United Kingdom and was anti-American. When speaking to an undercover 
FBI about traveling to ISIS territory, she argued that the “US has a thick cloud of 
falsehoods”.74 She also tweeted anti-US rhetoric and support of violence against 
Americans. In one of her tweets she wrote: "what makes me feel better after watching the 
news is that an akhi carried out an attack against US marines in TN! Alhamdulillah, the 
numbers of supporters are growing..."75 
Kristina Morvai, the only non-jihadist in the sample, portrays extremist views that 
are closely linked with political motives. She is a member of Hungary’s far-right Jobbik 
party and is not shy about her anti- Semitism and extremist beliefs. She takes a nationalist 
approach and argues for a "Hungary for Hungarians". She’s made some public 
 
73 MEMRI, "Released Palestinian Terrorist Ahlam Tamimi.” 
74  Counter Extremism Project, "Jaelyn Young." 
75 Apel, "Timeline: What We Know about Jaelyn Young.” 
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controversial statements such as “Liberal-Bolshevik Zionists” should start thinking about 
“where to flee and where to hide” and in response to Israeli casualties in Gaza, she said, 
“the only way to talk to people like you is by assuming the style of Hamas. I wish all of 
you lice-infested, dirty murderers will receive Hamas’ ‘kisses.’”76 
Regarding Hoda Muthana, it is difficult to conclude whether this was the initial 
push factor, but she propagated strong anti-US rhetoric. On Twitter, she called for 
violence against Americans on Memorial Day: “Americans wake up! Men and women 
altogether. You have much to do while you live under our greatest enemy, enough of 
your sleeping! Go on drive-bys and spill all of their blood or rent a big truck and drive all 
over them. Veterans, Patriot, Memorial etc…”77 She also belittled those who didn’t 
support ISIS. In another tweet she wrote “Soooo many Aussies and Brits here. But where 
are the Americans, wake up u cowards.”78 Shannon Maureen Conley told the FBI that, “[I 
am determined to defend] Muslims on the Muslim homeland against people who are 
trying to kill them," and that she “would rather be in prison than do nothing.”79 Hayat 
Boumedienne, while unclear if motivated by these beliefs, told the police when 
interrogated in 2010, “‘when I saw the massacre of the innocents in Palestine, in Iraq, in 
Chetchna, in Afghanistan or anywhere the Americans sent their bombers, all that… well, 
who are the terrorists?”80 
The limitations with determining political grievances as a motive for female 
terrorism is twofold: first, this sample is small and not representative. Second, it is 
 
76 Counter Extremism Project, "Krisztina Morvai."  
77 Hall, “Gone Girl.” 
78 Ibid. 
79 Deam, "Colorado Woman's Quest.” 
80 Cook, et al., “Deli Gunman’s Wife.” 
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unclear if this was the driving force or grievances that played a role in their 
radicalization. Were they taught anti-US rhetoric once they already joined or did they join 
because of these beliefs? Further research is required to understand the true role of state 
repression and political grievances as a determining push factor.  
In this sample, thirteen females were characterized as either first- or second-
generation immigrants. Aafia Saddiqui was originally from Pakistan and then got US 
citizenship. However, she later returned to Pakistan in 1993 to conduct research and 
where she ended up connecting with Al Qaeda. Aqsa Mahmood was not an immigrant 
herself, but her was father originally from Pakistan. Mediha lived in the US but was a 
Bosnian immigrant and Hoda Muthana’s father is a Yemeni UN diplomat. Other 
examples are Asia Siddiqui who was originally from Saudia Arabia, Hayat Boumedienne 
whose parents were Algerian immigrants, Jasminka Ramic and Sedina Unkic Hodzic, 
both Bosnian immigrants, Rowaida El-Hassan, a Sudanese immigrant, Tashfeen Malik, 
who was originally from Pakistan, and Sharmeena and Shamima Begum both have 
Bangladeshi parents. While it is unclear whether Yusra Ismail was born in Somalia or the 
US, she is referred to as a Somalian-American woman. A Daily Mail article on Ismail 
highlighted US authorities’ concern about young Somalian-Americans joining Islamic 
extremist groups, signaling that their split identity plays a role in their radicalization.81  
From this sample alone it is unclear how or why immigration plays a role in 
motivation, however, immigration often coincided with the political grievances discussed 
 
81 Hall, “Somali-American woman, 20, 'stole friend's passport.” 
29 
 
above. Further analysis should seek to understand the role of immigration as a push factor 
and how closely tied it is with political grievances as a push factor.  
Previous studies have found that poverty and a lack of education are not 
prominent factors amongst female terrorists and extremists as they are for males. In this 
sample, only five women seem to have been impoverished at some point in their life 
before radicalizing and this section will explore these characteristics.  
Ariel Bradley grew up in a house of five and claimed to a friend that she grew up 
extremely impoverished. One of her friends explained that “you think of milk as this 
necessity that everyone has in their fridge, but they were so poor they didn't have milk.”82 
Jasminka Ramic's family declared bankruptcy in 2012, just three years before she was 
arrested. Ramic’s only source of income was a monthly Social Security disability check 
of $5. Mediha Salkicevic describes her widowed mother as someone who went door to 
door to offer chores for pay and raised her family "with no income or pension.”83 Nicole 
Mansfield got pregnant at 15. Her daughter Triana posted on Facebook explaining: "My 
mother struggled to make ends meet and we often moved around... I never stayed in one 
place for long because my mother could never keep up with the bills."84 Lastly, Noelle 
Velentzas lived in various homeless shelters as a teenager including Jamaica, Islamic 
Circle of North America Relief Agency, Queens homeless shelter for a year.85  
While poverty is a factor in those five women’s lives, it is unclear how much of a 
factor it was on its own. These five cases do not confirm previous studies as it is not clear 
how socio-economic status played a role in some of the case studies.  
 
82 Hall, "How One Young Woman Went From Fundamentalist Christian To ISIS Bride."  
83 Goudie, "Lemon Drops and Genocide.” 
84 Warikoo, “From Michigan To a Violent Death in Syria.” 
85 CBS New York, "Noelle Velentzas, Asia Siddiqui Accused Of Alleged Terror Plot In U.S." 
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 In this sample, a lack of education did not seem to be a prominent push factor 
either. Most finished high school, had secondary degrees, and some even PHDs. Aafia 
Saddiqui had a PhD from MIT, Jaelyn Young was the daughter of a police officer and 
Navy veteran, an honors student, and a chemistry major at University. Rowaida El- 
Hussein had a master’s degree in pharmacy.  
Only four women stand out: Shamima and Sharmeena Begum left for Syria at 15 
and hence, did not complete high school, Colleen LaRose did not complete high school, 
and Ariel Bradley was a college dropout. However, Shamima and Sharmeena didn’t 
graduate because they left to Syria at 15 years old. They may have finished high school 
otherwise. In this sample, it does not seem that a lack of education or career played a role 
in their turn to terrorism or extremism. However, this can be sample specific and not 
representative of female terrorists in general. 
Pull Factors are aspects that make 
extremism and terrorism more appealing to 
the individual. In this sample I found pull 
factors such as ideology, identity/spiritual 
longing/belonging/purpose, incentives 
(mostly marriage and love), activism, and 
feminism. In broader terrorism studies, 
ideology seems to be a very clear factor in 
radicalization. In this sample, however, only Noelle Velentzas seems to have ideology as 
a prominent factor. She viewed Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam as her “heroes” 
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and believed Bin Laden's views were the same as her own. Noelle was inspired by other 
attacks in the US and used it as a blueprint for violent Jihad in the US.  
Nine portray characteristics of seeking identity/purpose. Ariel Bradley was 
described as someone who constantly shifted her identity. Before converting to Islam, she 
was an atheist and a socialist. “Be it religion, be it a man, be it a marriage, be it a child, 
be it ISIS, Ariel was always looking for something to define herself, an identity to cling 
to.”86 A friend of Bradley’s described her as someone who based her identity “..if she 
meets a guy that’s an atheist then she’s an atheist, falls into that for a year. Then the guy 
leaves and she meets somebody new, and it starts all over again...It seemed like whatever 
guy she was with, she would just crawl into his skin and kind of become him.”87 
 Colleen LaRose was also seeking fulfillment and purpose. When asked why she 
did what she did, she explained, “Love for my Prophet, love for my Ummah [community] 
and love for the brother that gave me the assignment…”88 “I just loved my brothers so 
much, when they would tell me stuff, I would listen to them, no matter what...And I also 
was ... lost.”89 Hoda Muthana sought out social media as a means to express herself. She 
grew up in a strict, sheltered home.  She got her first phone when graduating high school 
and while Hoda’s brothers could have Facebook accounts, the women in the family were 
prohibited from having Facebook or other messaging apps to communicate with non-
family members. Hoda’s father would check her phone to ensure she was obeying those 
rules.90 Her rebellion took her to more extreme version of Islam. One journalist described 
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Hoda as “a young woman caught between two worlds, a child of immigrants frustrated by 
the restrictions they placed on her and her sister while watching her brothers seemingly 
do whatever they pleased. A person searching for the connections that her parents’ rules 
made it so hard to form. A place to belong, and a greater purpose — though the one she 
ultimately found was utterly misguided. Her tweets were an extension of herself, 
performing what she perceived as the best version of herself, optimizing herself for the 
unforgiving seductions of social media.”91 A friend also explained that Twitter was 
Hoda’s alter ego; “what she lacked in her personality she would make up for on 
Twitter.”92  
Jamie Paulin Ramirez was also someone constantly looking for an identity. Her 
own mother described her as a lonely and insecure woman and that she “never really 
liked herself.”93 She immersed herself in different cultures and married and divorced 
multiple times. Eventually Ramirez moved in with her mother so she can save money, but 
they often argued about religion. She was “looking for a reason to leave."94 
 Lisa Smith was on a spiritual and identity search. “The pressure of life got to me. 
There was so much pressure to look good… and there were no morals, nothing solid. I 
was all airy-fairy on the outside, but inside I knew there was something wrong," she 
explained. She self-proclaimed herself as a party girl looking for meaning. She shared in 
one interview: "I didn't have much grounding in the Catholic faith. I was looking for 
answers - why we were here, what was our purpose in life. I just knew we couldn't be on 
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this Earth for no reason…I went through the whole spirituality phase, Buddhism and 
stuff, and nothing was registering. Fairies, angels, reiki, the works - and then I was 
thinking that there was no god, just a god consciousness.”95 She turned to Islam and 
became obsessed with studying the Koran. This was after her contradicting beliefs about 
Muslims: “"I'd see them and think: bombers”, she said.96 
 Nicole Lynn Mansfield’s old roommate believed that Mansfield turned to Islam 
because “It was a peaceful religion to her, and it gave her purpose as she was trying to 
find herself.”97 Mansfield’s parents got divorced when she was young, and she got 
pregnant as a teenager. She dropped out of (although she did get her GED and college 
degree later), eventually married but then divorced, and was looking for purpose.  
Samantha Lewthwaite, although raised Christian, was introduced to Islam by her 
Muslim neighbors. She turned to them for familial connection after her parents divorced. 
She later converted to Islam at the age of 17. She then radicalized to the extremist Islam, 
highlighted in her love poem to Osama Bin Laden, where she proclaimed: “my love for 
you is like no other.”98  
Shamima Begum also portrayed factors of belonging and connection. When 
explaining why she traveled to Syria at the age of 15, she shared that she liked how the 
Islamic State “showed that you can go [to Syria] and they'll take care of you. You can 
have your own family, do anything.”99  Lastly, for Safaa Boular, family and identity seem 
to strongly characterize her path.. Both her mother and sister, Mina Dich and Rizlaine 
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Boular, were part of Britain’s first all-female ISIS terrorist cell and Safaa began to 
radicalize when her mother showed signs of Jihadist support.100  
 In exploring pull factors for joining terrorist and extremist groups, this sample 
accounts most for characteristics of searching for identity, purpose, and meaning. Perhaps 
further analysis can explain if this is a meaningful motivation and characteristic of 
females.  
 Incentives for romance were found in this sample. Being incentivized by a man 
tends to be a large topic of discussion in the existing literature regarding female terrorists 
while for men, the incentives are often monetary. In this sample, more than half of the 
case studies accounted for some sort of relationship with a man. The question then 
became to what extent their male partners played in their radicalization and recruitment. 
Did they influence the females or did the females influence the males? Did they meet 
them during the radicalization process or when they already joined the group?  
No relation 
This study found that while many did have romantic partners in the picture, some 
had no role in their radicalization. For instance. Aafia Saddiqui was married to a 
Pakistani, man named Mohammed Amjad Khan. Khan stated that he stopped bringing 
colleagues to his home because Saddiqui would “only to talk about them converting to 
Islam.”101 The couple eventually moved to Pakistan together but got divorced shortly 
after. A few months later, Siddiqui married Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s (KSM) nephew, 
Ammar al-Baluchi. In her case, she tried to radicalize her first husband, and when that 
failed, she married someone that already had the same concept of faith that she did. 
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While she did have two romantic partners, it is important to recognize the lack of 
influence they had on her role in Al Qaeda. Similarly, Ahlam Ahmad al-Tamimi, got 
engaged to her cousin Nizar Tamimi who killed an Israeli settler in the West Bank and 
was serving a life sentence. However, they only got engaged after Tamimi went to prison 
for bombing Sbarro pizzeria in Jerusalem. She too had a romantic partner with a terrorist, 
yet it did not influence her behavior or terrorist acts. For Tamimi, the engagement and 
marriage were a ‘symbol of resistance’: “I resisted the occupation with my love and my 
engagement to this prisoner. Through the engagement, the prisoner tells the occupier that 
his life continues.”102  
Other case studies also portrayed characteristics of romance. However, an 
analysis of their rhetoric concludes that in their cases, love was not an incentive for 
radicalization. Hoda Muthana, Shamima Begum, Jamie Paulin Ramirez, Samantha 
Lewthwaite, Heather Elizabeth Coffman, Rowaida El- Hassan, and Jaelyn Young, are 
some examples of those findings. For them, their partners were not their introductory 
point to terrorist groups, and in some cases, the females influence even influenced their 
partners. Hoda Muthana clarified this when speaking to a journalist: “tell the West we 
didn't come here because we wanted to be jihadi wives. If that were the case you'd see 
most of us trying to go back. Who would risk everything they know and own to have a 
marriage that’s span isn't guaranteed for the next day.”103  
It is important to further analyze the impact of romance on female terrorists and 
extremists. As this sample highlights, many women did have romantic links to men who 
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were radicalized, however, it is important to recognize their lack of influence on them as 
a pull factor. 
Love as an incentive 
This does not mean that romance was not an incentive at all. Aqsa Mahmood is 
believed to have gotten radicalized online by Adeel Ulhaq, a British citizen who was 
eventually imprisoned for 
facilitating a young boy's travel to 
Syria. Mahmood’s parents believe 
that Ulhaq persuaded her to join 
ISIS by promising her a hand in marriage. Ariel Bradley married Yasin Mohamad, a 
British Jihadist fighter for ISIS, whom she met online. The couple travelled to the Middle 
East together. Before she met Mohamad, she met a religious Muslim man who rejected 
her romantically. It is believed that that man influenced her to look into Islam.104 
Haleema Mustafa met and married Ikar Mao and they traveled to Turkey together. 
Mustafa's family suspected that Mao was interested in ISIS and had a role in her 
radicalization. Sally Jones was also influenced by Junaid Hussein, who was killed in a US 
drone strike. She tweeted her support for him when he was killed (see right).105 Shannon 
Maureen Conley is also presumed to have traveled to Syria for the purpose of marrying a 
Tunisian ISIS fighter. 
 An analysis of romance as incentive for the women in this sample highlights that 
some join for a partner, while others either influence their partners, or meet them after 
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their radicalization. However, because this sample size is non-representative, the findings 
are exploratory and not confirmatory.  
 Activism and feminism are another two pull factors found in this sample. It 
seems that activism somewhat ties into the push factor of state repression and political 
motives. Krisztina Morvai, for instance, believes she is a human rights activist and “not 
your typical fascist or Nazi career." In her anti-Israel and pro-Palestine sentiment, she 
told a journalist who asked her the difference between the Jobbik party and WW2,  “go to 
Israel and ask what the difference is between Israel and the Nazis.”106 Morvai was, in 
fact, the Hungarian representative to the United Nation's Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women (CEDA). 
 Ariel Bradley grew up Christian. She denounced 
christianity and all religions and instead turned to atheism and 
focused on socialist activism and feminism, fighting for teachers’ 
rights, fair housing, and racial equality. She also began working 
to help the homeless. The photo on the right shows her protesting 
in Chattanooga.107 It is unclear if Bradley saw her role in ISIS as 
activism or if it was just part of her identity at the time that disappeared with everything 
else she fought for.      
For Nicole Lynn Mansfield, activism is a visible characteristic as well. She began 
posting Facebook photos of the Egyptian uprising during the Arab Spring as well as 
photos of the Syrian conflict. She also attended a rally in Washington in support of 
Egyptian activists aiming to overthrow President Hosni Mubarak during the Arab 
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Spring.108 Mansfield allegedly fought with the Assad regime opposition rebels and was 
killed doing so.  
Ahlam Ahmad al-Tamimi also truly believed 
she was advocating for resistance and liberation. 
She questioned: “Why are we considered to be 
terrorists? Why am I, Ahlam, considered to be a 
terrorist, when I am part of a movement for freedom 
and national liberation? I am part of a resistance 
movement that strives for liberation.”109 This 
highlights the discussion above about rationalizing 
terrorist acts when it is believed to be justified.  
 In this sample characteristics of feminism is not prominent. Colleen LaRose, 
when asked why she joined ISI did share "also I think I did it for pride. Sisters are never 
given assignments like the one I was given. I felt my brother had enough confidence and 
trust in me that he honored me by giving me the assignment."110 However, it is unclear if 
she only said this in retrospect and if it is inextricably linked to identity and purpose pull 
factors rather than a valid pull factor on its own.   
Personal Factors looks at what makes the specific individual more vulnerable to 
radicalization and recruitment. It tends to focus on trauma, psychological disorders, and 
personality traits. In this sample personal factors such as a history of drinking and drugs, 
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sexual abuse (rape/molestation), 
depression and mental instability, as 
well as loss, were found.   
Ariel Bradley, Colleen LaRose, 
and Lisa Smith, all have a history with 
drugs, drinking, or partying. Before 
converting, Bradley experimented with 
all sorts of drugs and was a heavy 
drinker. Friends explained that at one festival ‘She did so much acid that she collapsed 
during the Radiohead concert.”111 Colleen LaRose faced some dark days before she 
became Jihad Jane. She turned to prostitution, drinking, and drugs, including meth. In a 
special report for Reuters, LaRose’ journey is explained as shedding her old life; “46 
years scarred by rapes, prostitution, drugs and failed marriages - for this new one full of 
promise.”112 Lisa Smith, after her military service, turned to booze and drugs. She 
described herself as a “party girl who had tried cannabis and ecstasy.”113  
While these are not necessarily precursors to terrorism on its own, these are 
personal factors that may make an individual more susceptible to radicalization. While it 
is unclear if such factors are more predominant amongst female terrorists and extremist 
than males, or if it is of significance, these are factors that have been found and hence, 
explored.  
 
111 Hall, “How One Young Woman Went From Fundamentalist Christian To Isis Bride.” 
112 Shiffman, “Special Report.” 
113 Brady, “Who is Lisa Smith?” 
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In this sample abuse encompassed sexual molestation and rape as well. The three 
women that have a history of abuse are Asia Siddiqui, Colleen LaRose, Hayat 
Boumedienne. Asia Siddiqui was dating a man but was saving herself for marriage. 
However, the man she was with did not accept that choice and raped her instead.114 At 
eight years old, Colleen LaRose’s father began to rape her and her sister for years. Her 
father, Richard LaRose, confessed to raping her when confronted by LaRose’s counselor. 
LaRose took the phone and yelled at her dad: “Look what you’ve done to me! You did 
this to me! It’s your fault! Why? Why?”115 Hayat Boumedienne suffered abuse in foster 
care after her mother died when she was a young girl. She told a detective, “I was placed 
in care at the age of 12, because I did not accept the speed with which my father 
remarried after the death of my mother. I changed carers numerous times because I was 
beaten often.”116 How exactly abuse characterizes these women is unclear at the 
preliminary stage.  
Asia Siddiqui, Colleen LaRose, Heather Elizabeth Coffman, and Lisa Smith 
portray factors of depression and mental instability. Siddiqui was diagnosed with major 
depressive disorder and social anxiety and sought psychiatric treatment in 2014.117 
However, she presumably became depressed after she was raped. Colleen LaRose was 
also sent to a hospital for psychiatric treatment after her father raped her.118 In United 
States of America vs. Heather Elizabeth Coffman, Coffman’s history of mental health 
was described as “concerning.”119 She also self-diagnosed herself with various disorders. 
 
114 “United States of America v Noelle Velentzas, Defense Sentencing Memorandum.”   
115 Shiffman, “Special Report.” 
116 Farmer & Walton, “Paris Shooter's Girlfriend.” 
117 “United States of America v Noelle Velentzas, Defense Sentencing Memorandum.” pg. 7 
118 Shiffman, “Special Report.” 
119 “United States of America v Heather Elizabeth Coffman, Defendant, Position on Sentencing.” 
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Lastly, Lisa Smith found herself in a depression after a decade of military service which 
led her to drinking and drugs.  
Another noticeable characteristic is loss: Jamie Pauline, Mediha Salkicevic, Hayat 
Boumedienne, and Colleen LaRose, had lost loved ones prior to joining a terrorist group. 
Jamie Pauline Ramirez’s sister died of cancer, which resulted in her becoming embittered 
with God, despite being raised a Methodist.120 Mediha Salkicevic lost her father at six 
and her brother was killed in the Bosnian war. In the letter she sent to the US District 
Judge, she included a picture saying: “picture of my family whom get killed by hand of 
people like what they trying to accuse me they said I was supporting."121 Hayat 
Boumedienne also lost a parent at a young age and her father raised his seven children. 
Lastly, Colleen LaRose lost both her father and brother which drove her to attempted 
suicide.122  
While loss and other personal factors may not directly lead to radicalization on its 
own, coupled with other factors, such vulnerabilities may characterize female terrorists 
and extremists.  
 The ‘three Ps’ are interconnected and hence, it is difficult to determine what is the 
driving motivations for female terrorists and extremists. Many of the females account for 
numerous pushes, pull, and personal factors that often overlapped. If some of those 
factors were taken away from their history, would they still have turned down the same 
path or does it need to be the perfect recipe of characteristics? Perhaps a more 
comprehensive study with in-depth interviews could answer these questions.  
 
120 Shiffman, “Special Report.” 
121 Goudie, et al., “Lemon Drops and Genocide.”  








While a gendered framework is important in terrorism studies, it’s important to 
recognize how stereotypes may paint a skewed image of female terrorists and extremists. 
An analysis of these case studies highlights both the media and the women themselves 
utilizing gender stereotypes. The names given to these by the media usually focus on the 
fact that they are women, sensationalizing their actions. Some examples include: Aafia 
Saddiqui known as ‘Lady Al- Qaeda’, Ahlam Ahmad al-Tamimi referred to as 
the ‘celebrity terrorist’ and Sally Jones as the ‘white Widow’. Krisztina Morvai was 
called the ‘Nazi barbie’, and Sally Jones, the ‘white widow’. Even the term “ISIS brides” 
adds to the misconceptions about female. When looking at the profiles of male terrorists, 
however, their other names are just different versions or different spellings of their 
original names. For instance, the TED database has more than 20 different names that the 
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Abdelmalek Droukdel, an AQIM leader is known as. All, however, are different versions 
of his name or other names he was referred to. None are names to signify his gender.123 
When the media utilized gendered names it leads to inaccurate portrayals of 
female terrorists and extremists, which ultimately may drive groups to recognize a 
strategic advantage and propaganda value of women. Trivializing their actions through 
these names may also result in the findings above being missed. 
Furthermore, when analyzing the social media usernames for Twitter, Facebook, 
or Tumblr, it seems that the women were consciously aware of the strategic advantage 
they would have if they portray themselves in a gendered frame. For instance, Ariel 
Bradley used the username ‘LadyAppleSeed’, a very non- threatening persona. Jaelyn 
Young used @1_Modest_Woman on one of her accounts, and Kim Anh Vo utilized 
domains such as Miss. Bones,” and “Kitty Lee”, clearly including feminine names in her 
username. 
Before Krisztina Morvai became MEP, she was described as “the kind of woman 
that any political party would like on their ticket: an attractive blonde working mum, who 
juggles a high-flying legal career with bringing up three children...” This description 
painted her positively simply by focusing on her gender. Ahmad al-Tamimi utilized 
gender by disguising herself as a young Israeli girl, non-threatening and trustworthy in 
Jerusalem, and able to access a place her male counterparts could not. LaRose was 
considered an asset and recruited because of her gender and physical traits. She sent a 
message online, pledging to “blend in with many people… to achieve what is in my 
heart” by utilizing her blonde hair, white skin, and green eyes.124 Shamima Begum used 
 
123 Counterterrorism Project, “Abdelmalek Droukdel.” 
124 Shiffman, "Special Report." 
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the conventional portrayal of ISIS women's role as housewives to her advantage. She 
said, “They don’t have any evidence against me doing anything dangerous,” she said. “I 
was just a housewife.”125 She took advantage of the stereotype and used it as her defense 
for traveling to Syria.  
Understanding the characteristics of female terrorists and extremists is important 
if only to shed light on how stereotypes and false gendered assumptions offer these 
women and groups an advantage. If the characteristics of these women are misconceived, 
it may offer groups an incentive to recruit, utilize, and take advantage of females.  
CONCLUSION 
Further implications and recommendation  
As this was a preliminary and exploratory study, the aim was to analyze 
characteristics and themes of female terrorists and extremists using the CEP’s Terrorists 
and Extremists Database as a starting point and through multiple other sources, saturate 
the findings with content analysis. Multiple themes, factors, and characteristics of female 
terrorists have been discussed in this research study which expanded the existing 
literature by not limiting the sample to meet specific requirements. While no conclusion 
can be derived from this analysis, it can be a tool for further, more comprehensive 
studies. 
Limitations and future research 
 The primary limitation of this study was the data collection and sample size. 
Because of the sensitivity surrounding terrorism, the safety issues, and the hard to reach 
nature of the sample, no interviews, or surveys were conducted, and no primary data was 
 
125 Sky News, “IS Bride Shamima Begum Full Transcript.” 
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utilized. While secondary interviews were used, analysis was limited to the information at 
hand. This dataset was used because of its variety; its cross sectional in region, roles, 
motivations, etc. Yet, it is a small and non-representative sample. Furthermore, 40/41 
case studies are affiliated with jihadist groups which limits the findings to mainly jihadist 
ideology. 
Future research should choose larger, cross sectional samples that include jihadist 
and non-jihadist groups, with primary data collection to determine more conclusive 
results. Future studies should attempt to analyze what factors play the most significant 
roles in motivating female terrorists and extremists and if they differ between groups. 
This will be necessary to determine how to counter the radicalization of females and 
















Appendix A: Case Studies from the Counter Extremism Project Terrorist and 





        
 
          
                           
    Aafia Saddiqui                               
         Al Qaeda 
 
   
Ahlam Ahmad al-        
    Tamimi- Hamas               
          
    Aqsa Mahmood  
              ISIS    
    Ariel Bradley 
           ISIS 
        
      Asia Siddiqui   
          Al Qaeda  
   
                                    
   Colleen LaRose  
            ISIS 
 
   Haleema Mustafa 
             ISIS 
Hayat Boumeddiene  
             ISIS                      
  Heather E. Coffman 
              ISIS 
      Hoda Muthana    
              ISIS                                 
      Jaelyn Young  
              ISIS 
      Jaime Pauline    
 Ramirez – Al Qaeda                    
    Jasminka Ramic 
              ISIS 
    Keonna Thomas  
               ISIS                                    
       Kim Anh Vo 
             ISIS 
    Krisztina Morvai    











                                           
 
-  
          Lisa Smith 
               ISIS 
  Mediha Salkicevic 
               ISIS 
 
 
       Nicole Lynn 
Mansfield- Al Qaeda                      
    Noelle Velentzas     
              ISIS                                  
Rawdah Abdisalaam 
                ISIS  
 
   Rowaida El-Hassan 
               ISIS  
       Safaa Boular     
               ISIS                                          
       Sally Jones 
              ISIS   
Samantha Lewthwaite 
          Al-Shabaab                         
  Sedina Unkic Hodzic 
               Al Qaeda                                    
    Shamima Begum 
             ISIS  
Sharmeena Begum    
               ISIS                         
   Shannon Maureen 
      Conley - ISIS 
     Tafsheen Malik 
                ISIS 
        Yusra Ismail   
               ISIS                                      
        Umm Radwa    
                 ISIS                                             
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               Amal  
                ISIS 
   
           
 
           Ana Eashaa    
                ISIS                                          
          Azz Dine 
    ISIS                                    
      Bint Crackers  
              ISIS                                    
 
        Hallie Sheikh  
               ISIS                                          
          Hass Coast  
                ISIS 
   GreenBirdofDabiq                   
                 ISIS 
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